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United States Agricultural Trade: Where
Are the Gains?: Comment
Michael Martin, Larry Lev,  and Ali  Emami
At the WAEA  meeting in Honolulu July  10-
12,  1988, Professor Andrew Schmitz delivered
the opening paper entitled, "U.S. Farm Policy
and Gains from Trade." This paper has  since
appeared in the December  1988  WJAE under
the  title,  "United  States  Agricultural  Trade:
Where Are the Gains?"  In both presentations
Schmitz  offers  an interesting  synopsis of the
U.S.,  European  Community  (EC),  Canadian,
and Australian trade and policy situations. As
always, he provides a cogent and concise  dis-
cussion of the impact of various forms of pol-
icy intervention on national  gains from trade.
After examining  several  international  wheat
marketing  policy  alternatives,  he  concludes
with a specific  policy recommendation:  Since
it appears that free trade cannot be achieved,
the leading wheat exporters should pursue co-
ordinated production controls. Or, as Schmitz
puts it, "The alternative  solution to free trade
is clearly production controls by all including
the EC."
In a nutshell, Schmitz's  argument is as fol-
lows.  The  world  import  demand  for  grains
(wheat)  is price  inelastic.  Rather than  subsi-
dizing exports or dumping grain,  exporters as
a  group  should  pursue  harmonized  supply
management  to, in effect,  cartelize  the world
grain market.  This would result in: (a) an in-
creased  price for exported grain,  (b) increased
gross revenues from international sales for car-
tel members,  and (c)  reduced  cost of govern-
ment farm (grain) programs in the cartel mem-
ber countries.1
At first blush, Schmitz's proposed policy al-
ternative  has  a rather pleasing  ring. It  seems
to follow a well-marked  logical  path, and,  of
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i This  is essentially the argument made in Schmitz  et al.
course,  he  presents  it quite persuasively.  On
further reflection,  however,  the Schmitz pro-
posed  alternative  has  at  least  four  troubling
elements.
(1)  Schmitz  appears  to  ignore  the  issue  of
long-term supply response in the grain- (wheat-)
importing part of the world. A simple scenario
illustrates a potential flaw in the Schmitz pro-
posal.
Accepting, only for a moment, Schmitz's de-
mand  elasticity  assertion,  let  us  assume  the
excess demand  elasticity facing wheat export-
ers is -. 5.2 According to the U.S. Department
of Agriculture, annual world wheat production
in  recent  years  has been  about  510  million
metric tons (mmt). Wheat-importing countries
have  combined  annual  production  of about
320 mmt, and world wheat trade has averaged
approximately  105  mmt per year.
Now let's presume that cartel members agree
to raise  the wheat  export  price  by  20%.  To
prevent  a build up  of stocks,  a  10%  harmo-
nized reduction  in  supply for export  will  be
required.  In this case, cartel members will ex-
perience  a short-term increase  in export sales
revenues.  But,  of course,  the Schmitz  line  of
reasoning  only hangs together if it is assumed
that importers are passive market participants.
If, however, they respond to the induced higher
world wheat price  with increased  self-supply,
the cartel's gains may disappear.
One can readily conjure up a scenario under
which  a rise  in the  price  of wheat leads  im-
porters  to invest in new production  technol-
ogies  and  increased  wheat  plantings,  thereby
increasing  their  long-run  supply.  Importers
2 To be correct,  we are really interested  in the price flexibility of
excess demand.  If we  accept that the  flexibility is approximately
the inverse of  the elasticity, then we have a price flexibility of -2.
Thus a 1%  change in quantity marketed  will yield a 2%  change in
price.  For a detailed  explanation  of the elasticity-flexibility  rela-
tionship,  see Houck (1965).
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need only increase their wheat output by 4%
to more  than compensate  for  the  exporter's
supply controls.
The  cartel's  move  to  a  new,  higher  price
equilibrium  on  the assumed  excess-demand
curve  sets in motion  a  process  that actually
shifts the excess demand to the left. Gross rev-
enues decline  due to loss in both volume and
downward  pressure on price.  Further,  history
demonstrates  that once additional productive
capacity  is in place,  it is not quickly  or inex-
pensively abandoned.
It should also be noted that excess demand
for wheat is affected by importers' self-supply
of other  grains particularly rice.  Thus, an  ap-
preciation  of their  supply  responsiveness  in
rice  relative  to  changes  in the wheat  price  is
necessary  in fully  assessing  the viability of a
cartel.3
(2)  Even  ignoring  the  long-run  supply  re-
sponse  issue,  the  question  of the elasticity of
excess  demand  remains  an  important  one.
Schmitz simply asserts  that world grain mar-
kets are price inelastic. This assertion rests on
his rejection of all empirical  estimates  which
find the  contrary  along  with  a smattering  of
anecdotal  evidence.  Clearly,  there is no  con-
sensus in the empirical literature with respect
to price elasticity of demand for wheat. In re-
viewing this literature,  Gardiner and Dixit re-
ported finding estimates ranging from -.  14 to
-6.72.  Since  Schmitz's  prescription  rests
heavily on the assumption that excess demand
is price inelastic, some empirical support would
be comforting.
A modest extension of the theoretic  frame-
work utilized by Schmitz suggests that, rather
than being price  inelastic,  the excess demand
faced by a wheat cartel is actually likely to  be
price elastic. Under this framework,  we know
the elasticity of excess demand (E) equals the
weighted sum of the importers'  domestic  de-
mand and supply.4 The weights  are the ratio
of domestic demand to imports and the ratio
of domestic (importer) supply to imports,  re-
spectively,  such that:
IElI  =  e  (e  ) +  IeS I()
3  Further, if the demand  for wheat  is affected by the rice price,
that is, if wheat demand includes  a cross elasticity with rice, then
the price flexibility is not precisely the inverse of the price elasticity
(see Houck 1965).
4 For a more detailed discussion of  this relationship, see McCalla
and Josling or Houck (1986).
Here  ed is the elasticity of domestic demand,
Ddis total domestic demand, QTis the quantity
traded,  e, is the elasticity of domestic  supply,
and Sd is total domestic supply.
For an importer we know that (-)  is always
greater  than  one.  Thus  we  know that  excess
demand is unambiguously  more price  elastic
than domestic demand. We also know that the
ratio  Dd/QT equals  425/105  or 4.20  and that
Sd/Q  currently equals  320/105  or 3.25.
Now let us examine an extreme case, where
the domestic  supply is perfectly inelastic (e, =
0). For excess demand to be inelastic, say -. 95,
the  domestic  demand  elasticity  must be  less
than  -. 23. If the short-run  supply function is
even moderately elastic, the domestic demand
must be extremely inelastic for the excess de-
mand to be inelastic.  If e, =  .20, then ed must
be less than  -. 07.
Given the fact that a declining share of  world
wheat consumption  is  traded,  Schmitz's  rea-
soning  only holds if the importers'  domestic
demand is almost perfectly price inelastic. Since
an  increasing portion of traded wheat  is im-
ported by low income countries,  such  a very
low elasticity seems unlikely. Note for example
that  according to  Schmitz  et  al.,  "a  working
hypothesis is that the elasticity of import de-
mand  in low income  LDCs [Less-Developed
Countries]  is in the range  of -1  to  -1.5."
(3) Schmitz  does  not address  the  issue  of
possible grain production and marketing econ-
omies-of-scale  in  exporter  countries.  If grain
production  and marketing  in these  countries
is on a constant or increasing long-run average
cost function,  then harmonized supply reduc-
tion  will, at worse,  leave  per-unit production
and  marketing  cost  unchanged.  If,  however,
grain  production  and  marketing  is  on  a de-
clining long-run average cost function, then the
Schmitz prescription could lead to increases in
per-unit  production  and  marketing  costs  as
output is forced back up the cost function.  In
this instance,  Schmitz's expected gains in ex-
port prices and revenues could be completely
or partially offset by production and marketing
cost increases.  Whether grain production  and
marketing economies-of-scale  do, indeed,  ex-
ist is  open to empirical  assessment.  It  seems
reasonable, however, to expect that production
and marketing considerations be addressed in
any serious debate on multilateral supply man-
agement.
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(4) Schmitz concludes with  a pragmatic  ar-
gument. It is his contention that the likelihood
of a U.S.-EC agreement on removal of all trade
distorting  agricultural  programs  is  extremely
small. Yet he argues that it is entirely reason-
able  to expect that the U.S.,  the EC, and  the
others can reach an agreement on the complex
set of elements necessary to make a cartel func-
tion. Schmitz  provides little support,  beyond
conjecture, that agreement on creation and op-
eration of a grain cartel can be  more readily
achieved than agreement  on trade liberalizing
policy reform.
Professor Schmitz has a reputation for being
bold and provocative.  He certainly lived up to
his reputation at the WAEA meetings. His pa-
per and subsequent  WJAE article raise  again
a number of important researchable  issues. If
it is, indeed, his intention to be a serious ad-
vocate for the  creation of a grain cartel,  then
he bears a major responsibility for analytically
responding  to questions  such as those  raised
here.  The burden of proof rests with the ad-
vocate. If, however, his purpose is to stimulate
a scholarly  debate,  then all  of us with  an in-
terest in agricultural trade and trade policy have
work to do.
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